THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE THAT PROTECTS
PATIENT IDENTITY
The case of In re ZunigaI has reawakened the dispute regarding federal judicial recognition of a psychotherapist 2 -patient privilege.3 In
Zuniga, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, while
recognizing the existence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege protecting confidential communications, held that mere disclosure of a patient's
identity was not privileged. 4 In recognizing the existence of the privilege,
the Sixth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in a developing split among the
courts of appeals on this issue. 5 Yet in refusing to extend the privilege to
protect against the disclosure of the identity of a patient receiving psy6
chotherapy, the Zuniga court followed unanimous precedent.
1. 714 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983 (1983). Zuniga affirmed orders of a
federal district court holding two psychiatrists in civil contempt for failing to respond appropriately
to a subpoena duces tecum issued by a grand jury in connection with an investigation of alleged
billing fraud. Id. at 635-36, 642. Specifically, the subpoenas ordered the psychiatrists to produce
information as to the identity of certain named patients, the dates on which they were treated, and
the length of treatment on each date. Id. at 635-36. The psychiatrists maintained that the documents sought by the grand jury were protected from disclosure by a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id. at 636.
2. As used in this note, the term "psychotherapist" will refer to a broad group of individuals
who provide psychological services to their clients or patients, including social workers and psychiatrists as well as psychologists. Cf S. STONE & R. LIEBMAN, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES 385-87
(1983).
3. Although no general physician-patient privilege was recognized at common law, the states
began to adopt limited statutory privileges for the psychotherapist-patient relationship in the early
1950's. See Rule 504 advisory committee note, Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and
Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1973) (discussing possibility of general physician-patient privilege
and problems inherent in the privilege); Comment, Confidential Communications to a Psychotherapist: A New TestimonialPrivilege, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 384, 385 (1952) (discussing Binder v. Ruvell,
Civil Docket 52C2535 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ill. June 24, 1952), and calling it "the first decision of
its kind without statutory support" to uphold a psychiatrist's claim of privilege; also surveying the
common-law development of the general physician-patient privilege and advocating distinguishing it
from the psychotherapist-patient relationship).
4. Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639.
5. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
6. See Shuman & Weiner, The PrivilegeStudy: An EmpiricalExaminationof the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege, 760 N.C.L. REv. 893, 900-01 (1982) ("argument in favor of protecting the
identity of the patient under the privilege in psychotherapy . . . has yet to be recognized by the
courts"); Note, The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege in FederalCourts, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
791, 815 n.97 (1984) ("other courts [in addition to Zuniga] have also declined to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege to protect information about the fact. . . of treatment") (citing In re Doe,
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This note will argue, first, that federal courts should recognize a
psychotherapist-patient privilege, 7 and, second, that such a privilege
should include protection of a patient's identity. 8 No court, including
those that recognize the psychotherapist-patient privilege, has ever protected a patient's identity or the dates and duration of treatment ses-

sions. 9 Many courts, however, have justified protection of individual
identity in other contexts-most notably, the identity of a journalist's

confidential source,10 of an informant in a criminal prosecution, 1 1 and of

the client in an attorney-client relationship. 12 This note suggests that the
rationales used by the courts in many of these cases are similarly applica3
ble to the psychotherapist-patient situation.1
711 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1983); In Re Pebsworth, 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983); Flora v. Hamilton, 81
F.R.D. 576 (M.D.N.C. 1978); Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)). But cf
infra note 9.
7. See infra notes 30-46 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 47-75 and accompanying text. Other commentators have reviewed the historical and legal background and the recent judicial activity in the area of the psychotherapistpatient privilege, and argue that communications between patient and psychotherapist ought to be
protected. See Note, The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege-The Sixth Circuit Does the Decent
Thing: In re Zuniga, 33 U. KAN. L. REv. 385 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Note, Privilege]; Note,
supra note 6. This note, however, will focus on the more specific issue whether patient identity
should come within the scope of the privilege.
9. See supra note 6.
While some courts have been sensitive to the need to protect a psychotherapy patient's identity,
see infra notes 59-74 and accompanying text, none have actually required protection of identity
under Rule 501.
In Lora v. Board ofEduc., 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), the court's discussion of the importance of protecting a psychiatric patient's identity led to a decision to obtain rather than protect
patient information. See infra notes 58-67 and accompanying text. Thus, in Lora, the court's recognition of the value of anonymity was used as a sword rather than a shield, in order for the court to
allow discovery of patient files redacted as to patient identity. See Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 586-87.
Moreover, the Zuniga court, in a footnote to its holding that "as a general rule, the identity of a
patient . . . does not fall within the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege," Zuniga, 714
F.2d at 640, stated that "this holding does not mean that a court could not in its discretion or
compelled by considerationsofconstitutionalprivacy. . . protect the identity of patients." Id. at 640
n.7. The court then cited the Lora decision as support for this proposition. In contrast to the
reasoning of these two decisions, this note will argue that protection of identity should be evaluated
as part of the psychotherapist-patient privilege, effective as a shield against discovery of such
information.
10. See infra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 100-21 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 122-43 and accompanying text.
13. The Supreme Court's proposed Federal Rules of Evidence created a federal psychotherapist-patient privilege. Rule 504, Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56
F.R.D. 183, 241 (1973). Proposed rules of the 500 series that were not adopted in the final Federal
Rules of Evidence adopted by Congress, will be cited hereinafter as Proposed Rules. See infra notes
14-16 and accompanying text.
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THE POWER OF THE FEDERAL COURTS TO CREATE THE
PRIVILEGE AND THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW

The FederalRules of Evidence.

Federal Rule of Evidence 501, in broad, sweeping terms, confers
upon the federal courts the power to create evidentiary privileges by interpreting the principles of the common law "in the light of reason and
experience." 1 4 As originally submitted to Congress by the Supreme
Court, article V of the Rules contained, among others, a specific rule
defining a psychotherapist-patient privilege. 15 The House Judiciary
14. Rule 501 provides:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions
and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 501.

15. Proposed Rule of Evidence 504 provided:
PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

(a) Definitions.
(1) A "patient" is a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a
psychotherapist.
(2) A "psychotherapist" is (A) a person authorized to practice medicine in any state
or nation, or reasonably believed by the patient so to be, while engaged in the diagnosis or
treatment of a mental or emotional condition including drug addiction, or (B) a person
licensed or certified as a psychologist under the laws of any state or nation, while similarly
engaged.
(3) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation,
examination, or interview, or persons reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis and treatment under the
direction of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family.
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications, made for the purposes of diagnosis or treatment of his mental or emotional condition, including drug addiction, among himself, his psychotherapist, or persons who are participating in the diagnosis
or treatment under the direction of the psychotherapist, including members of the patient's
family.
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the patient, by
his guardian or conservator, or by the personal representative of a deceased patient. The
person who was the psychotherapist may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the
patient. His authority to do so is presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(d) Exceptions.
(1) Proceedingsfor hospitalization. There is no privilege under this rule for communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if
the psychotherapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has determined that the patient
is in need of hospitalization.
(2) Examination by order ofjudge If the judge orders an examination of the mental
or emotional condition of the patient, communications made in the course thereof are not
privileged under this rule with respect to the particular purpose for which the examination
is ordered unless the judge orders otherwise.
(3) Condition an element of claim or defense. There is no privilege under this rule as
to communications relevant to an issue of the mental or emotional condition of the patient
in any proceeding in which he relies upon the condition as an element of his claim or
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Committee amended article V, however, by replacing the Court's specific
enumerated privilege rules 16 with the single rule noted above. 17

The rationale for eliminating the several enumerated privileges in
favor of a broad general rule is consistent with an expansive rather than a
restrictive view of the role of the federal courts in recognizing evidentiary

privileges. The Judiciary Committee did not intend to object to any of
the specifically proposed privileges, including the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. 18 As Congress explained, "our action should be understood as
reflecting the view that the recognition of a privilege based on a confiden-

tial relationship and other privileges should be determined on a case-bycase basis." 19
defense, or, after the patient's death, in any proceeding in which any party relies upon the
condition as an element of his claim or defense.
Proposed Rule 504, 56 F.R.D. 103, 240-41 (1973).
16. The Supreme Court proposed a number of specific rules. Nine of these set forth subjects or
relationships, not mentioned in the Constitution, that the federal courts were to recognize as privileged. These were Required Reports (Proposed Rule 502), Lawyer-Client (Proposed Rule 503), Psychotherapist-Patient (Proposed Rule 504), Husband-Wife, (Proposed Rule 505), Communications to
Clergymen (Proposed Rule 506), Political Vote (Proposed Rule 507), Trade Secrets (Proposed Rule
508), Secrets of State and Other Official Information (Proposed Rule 509), and Identity of Informer
(Proposed Rule 510). Proposed Rules 502-510, 56 F.R.D. 103, 234-58 (1973). Proposed Rule 501
provided that courts could recognize only the above privileges, "other rules adopted by the Supreme
Court" and those privileges "required by the Constitution . . .or provided by Act of Congress."
Proposed Rule 501, 56 F.R.D. 183, 230 (adopted in different form as FED. R. EvID. 501).
17. S.REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 7051, 7058.
18. Id. at 7059 ("It should be clearly understood that, in approving this general rule as to
privileges, the action of Congress should not be understood as disapproving any recognition of a
psychiatrist-patient, or husband-wife or any other of the enumerated privileges contained in the
Supreme Court rules."). Moreover, Rule 504 was adjudged an appropriate guide and standard for
applying Rule 501 to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Lora v. Board of Educ., 74 F.R.D. 565,
569 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
19. S.REP. No. 1277, supra note 17, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NE.Ws at 7059.
The second part of Rule 501 indicates that federal common law should govern the recognition
of privileges in federal question and criminal cases, and that in civil actions and proceedings governed by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), state privilege law should apply. FED. R.
EVID. 501.
The language of this part of the rule was the subject of intense debate. Some Senators feared

that the language of the rule would create serious difficulty, because state law would apply if the
issue were an element of a state claim or defense, but not if it were a mere "step along the way in the
proof of it." S. REP. No. 1277, supra note 17, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7058. In the
opinion of the Senate committee, "[tihe question of what is an element of a claim or defense is likely
to engender considerable litigation." Id. The Senate suggested an alternative, which provided:
[I]n criminal and Federal question civil cases, federally evolved rules on privilege should
apply since it is Federal policy which is being enforced. Conversely, in diversity cases
where the litigation in question turns on a substantive question of state law, . . . State
rules of privilege should apply unless the proof is directed at a claim or defense for which
Federal law supplies the rule of decision (a situation which would not commonly arise).
Id. at 7059. The Conference Report, however, must be presumed definitive on the question of congressional intent as to the interpretation of the Rule's language. Thus, this note presumes that (I) in
all federal question and criminal cases, federal privilege law will apply, (2) in diversity cases "where
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The Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege in the Federal Courts.

Judicial recognition of any federal evidentiary privilege depends
upon a careful balancing process. "The relationship in question and its
underlying values must be thought more important than the accurate
outcome of judicial proceedings, and the absence of the privilege must
threaten to destroy the relationship and its underlying values."'20 Because of the unique character of psychotherapy, a psychotherapist generally cannot successfully treat a patient unless he can assure the patient of
complete confidentiality. 2 1 Consequently, in order to safeguard the therapy relationship, a privilege to withhold therapy-related evidence from a
22
judicial proceeding is necessary.
Although the federal courts have recognized the unique nature of
the psychotherapist-patient relationship, 2 3 they have failed to reach a
a claim or defense is based upon federal law,. .. federal privilege law will apply to evidence relevant
to the federal claim or defense," and (3) in other diversity cases, state privilege law will apply. See
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEvs 7098, 7100-01 (citing Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942)).
20. Shuman & Weiner, supra note 6, at 893-94. Because all evidentiary privileges withhold
potentially dispositive evidence from the judicial process, "they must be strictly construed." Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1979). The policy involved has been clearly stated by the
Supreme Court on several occasions. See, eg., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1959)
("The pertinent general principle, responding to the deepest needs of society, is that society is entitled to every man's evidence."); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) ("Certain exemptions from attending or, having attended, giving testimony are recognized by all courts. But every
such exemption is grounded in a substantial individual interest which has been found. . . to outweigh the public interest in the search for truth.") (emphasis added).
In Elkins the Supreme Court acknowledged that the primary role of the court is to serve justice,
and in doing so, "the enforcement of basic moralities by courts should at times be deemed more
important than the full utilization of all relevant evidence in a particular case." Elkins, 364 U.S. at
234-35. Thus, the Court has demonstrated a concern for individual protection, even at the cost of
some relevant evidence.
21. R. SLOVENKO, PSYCHOTHERAPY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
50 (1966) (quoting 4 GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, REPORTS AND SYMPOSIUMS, REPORT No. 45, at 111 (1960) [hereinafter cited as GAP REPORT No. 45]).
22. The proponents of the privilege firmly believe "that the social value which effective psychiatric treatment has for the community far outweighs the potential loss of evidence resulting from the
withholding of testimony by a psychiatrist about his patient." Id.
23. One court has adopted verbatim the views advanced in a scholarly treatise:
The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the world. He exposes to
the therapist not only what his words directly express; he lays bare his entire self, his
dreams, his fantasies, his sins, and his shame. Most patients who undergo psychotherapy
know that this is what will be expected of them, and that they cannot get help except on
that condition. . . . It would be too much to expect them to do so if they knew that all
they say-and all that the psychiatrist learns from what they say-may be revealed to the
whole world from a witness stand.
Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (quoting M. GUTTMACHER AND H.
WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 272 (1952)).
Another rationale for the psychotherapist-patient privilege was cited by the Zuniga court:
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special need to maintain confidentiality. His capacity to help his patients is completely dependent upon their willingness and ability to talk
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consensus on whether the privilege merits judicial recognition. 24 Two
obstacles inhibit the proper disposition of many psychotherapist-patient
privilege cases by the federal courts. First, courts continue to equate the

psychotherapist-patient relationship with the physician-patient relationship, ignoring the special circumstances of the patient undergoing psy-

chotherapy. 25 In re Zuniga demonstrates the second common error by

upholding the existence of the privilege, 26 yet failing to realize that the
freely. This makes it difficult if not impossible for him to function without being able to
assure his patients of confidentiality and, indeed, privileged communication. . . . [While]
there may be exceptions to this general rule.
. , there is wide agreement that confidentiality is a sine qua non for successful psychiatric treatment. The relationship may well be
likened to that of the priest-penitent or the lawyer-client. Psychiatrists not only explore
the very depths of their patients' conscious, but their unconscious feelings and attitudes as
well. Therapeutic effectiveness necessitates going beyond a patient's awareness and, in order to do this, it must be possible to communicate freely. A threat to secrecy blocks successful treatment.
Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 638 (quoting GAP RIEPORT No. 45, supra note 21, at 92) (footnotes omitted)
quoted in Proposed Rule 504 advisory committee note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1973). See also U.S. v.
Layton, 40 F.R.D. 520, 526 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (federal courts have recognized that psychotherapy
"will usually be seriously jeopardized by the lack of any guarantee of confidentiality").
24. Compare United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1167 (11th Cir. 1983) (recognizing
general validity of patient's privacy interest in confidentiality of medical records and society's interest in encouraging free flow of information between patient and psychotherapist, but holding that
these interests "must 'yield to the paramount right of the defense to cross examine effectively the
witness in a criminal case' ") (quoting United States v. Soc'y of Ind. Gasoline Marketers, 624 F.2d
461, 469 (4th Cir. 1979)); Ramer v. United States, 411 F.2d 30, 39-40 (9th Cir.) (privilege may exist
when a psychiatrist treats a patient, but not when the psychiatrist examines a person in order to
testify about his condition), cert denied, 396 U.S. 965 (1969); and Flora v. Hamilton, 81 F.R.D. 576,
579-80 (M.D.N.C. 1978) (recognizing policies behind psychotherapist-patient privilege, but ruling
that plaintiff who put at issue his ability to work was compelled, for effective discovery, to allow
inspection of his army medical file) with United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir.)
(flatly rejecting the privilege), cert denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976); United States v. Witt, 542 F. Supp.
696, 698-99 (S.D.N.Y.) (refusing to recognize the privilege and noting that even if psychotherapistpatient privilege is theoretically plausible, right to invoke it is "not absolute"), afid, 697 F.2d 301
(2d Cir. 1982); and United States v. Brown, 479 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (D. Md. 1979) (holding that
"[n]o general psychiatrist-patient privilege is available to bar the production of documents under the
Federal Rules of Evidence"). See also Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (interpreting D.C. statute granting psychotherapist-patient privilege). In United States v. Layton, 90
F.R.D. 520, 525 (N.D. Cal. 1981), the court asserted that federal courts have universally stated that
no psychotherapist-patient privilege existed at common law and that, therefore, it does not exist in
the federal courts. The Layton court mentioned, however, that federal courts have recognized that
the decision to see a psychiatrist falls within a "cluster of constitutionally protected choices." Id. at
526.
25. "In both Lindstrom and Meagher, in which the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits refused to accept the privilege, the courts simply equated [the psychotherapist-patient privilege] with the physician-patient privilege without analyzing the unique aspects of the psychotherapist-patient
relationship." Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 638.
26. The Zuniga court "recognized the compelling necessity for the privilege," id. at 639, but
concluded that this did not justify extending the scope of the privilege to prevent disclosure of patient identity, id. at 640.
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mere fact that a patient is receiving psychotherapy is also confidential. 27
The Zuniga court did, however, express the proper approach: "Just as
the recognition of privileges must be undertaken on a case-by-case basis,
so too must the scope of the privilege be considered." 2 8
II. THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
Because no doctor-patient privilege existed at common law, 29 courts
that fail to distinguish the psychotherapist-patient relationship from the
traditional doctor-patient relationship automatically refuse to recognize a
psychotherapist-patient privilege. When the psychotherapist-patient relationship is examined, however, it becomes clear that the relationship
fully satisfies the requirements for a federal evidentiary privilege.
Federal courts have cited with approval Dean Wigmore's four fundamental conditions necessary to establish any privilege:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will
not be disclosed.
(2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community
ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of
the communications must be greater30than the benefit thereby gained
for the correct disposal of litigation.
Wigmore maintains that "[a] negative answer to any one of these [criteria] would leave the privilege without support. ' 3 1 In applying this standard to the physician-patient relationship, the federal courts agree that
the harm done to the litigation process by withholding information generally outweighs the injury done to the relationship, because that rela32
tionship does not depend upon secrecy.
27. Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REv. 175,
188 (1960) ("It is vital to maintain confidentiality as to the fact of treatment as well as to communications made in treatment."); see infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
28. Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 639 (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396-97 (1981)).
29. E.g., United States v. Williams, 337 F. Supp. 1114, 1115 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
30. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2285 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961) (emphasis in original).
31. I1d., § 2380a, at 829. Wigmore was a "vigorous opponent of the physician-patient privilege." Rappeport, Psychiatrist-PatientPrivilege, 23 MD. L. REv. 39, 48 (1963).
32. See, eg., United States v. Kansas City Lutheran Home & Hosp. Ass'n, 297 F. Supp. 239,
243-44 (.D.
Mo. 1969) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 2380a, at 831-32). The Kansas
City court stated:
It is certain that the practical employment of the privilege has come to mean little but
the suppression of useful truth-truth which ought to be disclosed and would never be
suppressed for the sake of any inherent repugnancy in the medical facts involved. Ninetynine percent of the litigation in which the privilege is invoked consists of three classes of
cases-actions on policies of life insurance where the deceased's misrepresentations of his
health are involved, actions for corporal injuries where the extent of the plaintiff's injury is
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The need for the psychotherapist-patient privilege, however, is dis-

tinguishable from the need that arises from the traditional physician-patient situation. The Supreme Court recognized the important differences
between the two relationships by including the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in its proposed Federal Rules of Evidence 33 while denying privileged status to the physician-patient relationship. Moreover, several
commentators have suggested that the psychotherapist-patient situation
is more analogous to the priest-penitent relationship than to the doctorpatient relationship. 34 Both psychiatry and religion are founded on the

elements of "concern, sensible involvement, sympathy, and a respect for
the dignity of the individual.

'35

As in the practice of confession, "psy-

chotherapy by its very nature is worthless unless the patient feels assured
from the outset that whatever he may say will be forever kept
'36
confidential."

Though federal courts have held that the physician-patient relationship fails to meet Wigmore's standard,37 several commentators have indicated that Wigmore's four prerequisites are satisfied in the case of the
at issue, and testamentary actions where the testator's mental capacity is disputed. In all of
these the medical testimony is absolutely needed for the purpose of learning the truth. In
none of them is there any reason for the party to conceal the facts, except as a tactical
maneuver in litigation. . . . In none of these cases need there be any fear that the absence
ofthe privilege will subjectively hinderpeoplefrom consultingphysiciansfreely. The actually
injured person would still seek medical aid, the honest insured would still submit to medical examination, and the testator would still summon physicians to his cure.
Id (emphasis added). See also United States v. Mancuso, 444 F.2d 691, 695 (5th Cir. 1971) (physician-patient privilege depends on statute and does not exist at common law); Barnes v. United States,
374 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir.) (because existence of privilege depends on statute, if no such statute
exists in court's jurisdiction, physician-patient privilege is not available), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 917
(1967).
33. A specific psychotherapist-patient privilege was set forth in Proposed Rule 504, 56 F.R.D.
183, 240-41 (1973). See supra note 13.
34. C. DEWI=r, PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT 88 n.8
(1958) (quoting Comment, supra note 3, at 386). Wigmore concluded that the priest-penitent relationship meets the four criteria and is therefore entitled to enjoy the testimonial privilege. First,
permanent secrecy is essential to religious confession. Second, penitential confessions would cease if
they were subject to disclosure in court. Third, the penitential relationship is worth fostering, and
fourth, the injury to the penitential relationship by disclosure is significant while "the gain [to justice] would be merely the party's own confession. . . [which] ought in no system of law to be relied
upon as a chief material object of proof." 8 J. WIOMORE, supra note 30, § 2396, at 878.
35. R. SLOVENKO, supranote 21, at 39 (quoting 1. EWALT & D. FARNSWORTH, TExTaOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY 300 (1963)).
36. Comment, supra note 3, at 386.
Without a promise of secrecy from the therapist, buttressed by a legal privilege, a
patient would not be prone to reveal personal data which he fears might evoke social disapproval. Not only is such data essential for the purpose of constructing a reliable case history, but also the catharsis achieved by its verbalization may itself be a significant factor in
treatment.
Id at 386-87.
37. See supra note 32.
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relationship between psychotherapist and patient. 38 First, communications from a patient to a psychotherapist do originate in the expectation
of confidentiality. Psychiatric patients divulge to their therapists secret
thoughts and emotions that they would not reveal even to their families
or close friends. 39 Communications that are made during therapy may
reveal unattractive and antisocial tendencies of the patient; thus psychotherapy patients expect and demand confidentiality in return for their
open disclosure. 4°
Second, this element of confidentiality is essential to a complete and
satisfactory relationship between the parties. In order for treatment to be
successful, patients must be able to communicate their thoughts and
emotions freely and fully, even when such thoughts are abhorrent to society. 41 If patients suspect disclosure of their confidences, they will hesitate to consult a psychotherapist and may forego needed treatment. 42
Emotional and social problems, if untreated, are detrimental to both the
individual and society. 43 Thus, as evidenced by the popularity and respect psychotherapy has gained as a science, Wigmore's third condition
is satisfied, because the psychotherapist-patient relationship is one that
the community considers worth fostering. 44
Finally, the injury to the psychotherapist-patient relationship from
disclosing confidential communications far outweighs the incremental
45
benefit such communications can provide as courtroom evidence. Most
of the information communicated to psychotherapists is not factual;
rather, it is an abstract expression of the patient's inner feelings and emotions. These impressions lack accuracy, are often speculative, and are
not necessarily sincere, rendering them "irrelevant and immaterial evidence."' 46 The required balance tilts in favor of protecting the confidenti38. See Slovenko, supra note 27, at 184-95 (explaining in detail how each of four criteria is

met); Comment, supra note 3, at 387 (similar, but with less extensive discussion of Wigmore's four
criteria). But cf Shuman & Weiner, supra note 6, at 900-04 (describing some problems with the
privilege's theoretical justifications).
39. See Slovenko, supra note 27, at 185.

40. Id. at 186-88.
41. Id. at 186-87.

42. Id. at 185-87.
43. See Smith, ConstitutionalPrivacy in Psychotherapy, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1980):
The societal interest in protecting the confidentiality of therapy is to promote emotional and mental health, which ultimately will reduce antisocial activity and other societal
burdens that result from untreated or poorly treated mental problems. Successful psychotherapy may reduce social problems such as juvenile delinquency, marital complications,
and violent crime. It may also reduce the cost of caring for dependents of the mentally ill
and increase the productivity of those with mental deficiencies or difficulties.

Id. at 39.
44. See Slovenko, supra note 27, at 192.
45. Id.
46. IMLat 194.
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ality of such disclosures because they are of dubious value at trial, and of

paramount value to successful psychiatric treatment.
III.

PROTECTION OF PATIENT IDENTITY

In re Zuniga demonstrates the uniform reluctance of the federal
courts to extend the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege to include protection of patient identity. 47 After balancing the interests protected by allowing the evidence to be withheld with those advanced by
disclosure, 4 8 the Zuniga court held that, as a general rule, information as
to the identity of a psychotherapist's patients-the patients' names, the
dates on which they were treated, and the length of treatment on each
date-does not fall within the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 49 The court observed that "[t]he essential element of the psychotherapist-patient privilege is its assurance . . . that [the patient's]

innermost thoughts may be revealed without fear of disclosure" and that
"[m]ere disclosure of the patient's identity does not negate this ele-

ment." 50 This interpretation of the privilege's scope fails to consider that

in today's society many people desire and expect to maintain secrecy as
to the fact that they are receiving psychiatric treatment.
While the Zuniga court was correct in recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege, the court failed to distinguish completely the psy-

chotherapist-patient from the physician-patient relationship when it
refused to extend the scope of the privilege to include protection of patient identity.5 1 Federal courts interpreting state physician-patient privilege statutes note that the physician-patient privilege extends only to
communications, and not to the existence of the relationship.5 2 It is in47. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
48. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that recognition of federal evidentiary
privileges should occur on a case-by-case basis, see United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367
(1980); Trammel, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980), and that the scope of such privileges should therefore be
determined in the same way. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396-97 (1981).
49. Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 640.
50. Id.
51. Although the court recognized the distinction in determining whether the psychotherapistpatient privilege existed, id. at 638-39, it inexplicably blurred the distinction in determining the scope
of the privilege, id. at 640.
52. See Ranger, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 196 F.2d 968, 973 (6th Cir. 1952)
(under Michigan law, testimony by physician about date of attendance is not privileged); Simpson v.
Braider, 104 F.R.D. 512, 523 (D.D.C. 1985) ("[N]ames of therapists, dates of visits and general
purpose of treatment do not fall within the physician-patient privilege. . . ."); Shuman & Weiner,

supra note 6, at 900 ("[T]he physician-patient privilege has not been construed ...to protect
against disclosure of an individual's status as a patient unless to do so would reveal the substance of
the communication ....");Slovenko, supra note 27, at 188 n.46 ("[T]he fact of the physicianpatient relationship, that the person was under treatment, the number of visits, and the duration of
treatment, are not privileged areas.").
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appropriate, however, for courts to treat the psychotherapist-patient
privilege in a similar manner. In order to encourage people to seek
needed psychiatric help, the mere existence of the relationship must remain confidential. 53 A powerful social stigma is often associated with
psychiatric treatment.54 For example, there is evidence that people
53. See R. SLOVENKO, supra note 21, at 43. ("[W]ithout assurance of confidentiality, a person
would even hesitate to contact a psychiatrist, much less to enter into a meaningful therapeutic relationship with him.").
54. The social stigma suffered by patients of psychotherapy when the fact of their treatment is
revealed is well documented. See Slovenko, Accountability and Abuse of Psychiatric Confidentiality,
2 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 431, 433, 438 (1979) ("Many psychiatric patients fear that they will
become objects of stigma, censure and ridicule if even disclosure of the [therapy] relationship is
made.") [hereinafter cited as Slovenko, Accountability]; id. at 442-43 ("Often, one of the most intimate secrets of a psychiatric patient is that he or she is a psychiatric patient."); see also AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, CONFIDENTIALITY AND THIRD PARTIES, TASK FORCE REPORT 9, at iv (June
1975) ("[T]he mere disclosure of the fact of psychiatric treatment is sometimes felt to be a hazard to
the patient.").
It has been said that "a person sees a psychiatrist, by and large, with the same secrecy that a
man goes to a bawdy house." Slovenko, Accountability, supra, at 453 (citing Slovenko, supra note
27, at 188 n.46). One member of President Carter's Commission on Mental Health, a former mental
patient, stated at the Commission's first meeting:
I am half in the closet and half out. Iam a former patient, and I intended to have everyone
on the Commission know that; but I did not want to announce it to the United States of
America. I have been all over the United States... talking about mental health issues
and about patients' rights issues. But the people in the place where I live do not know,
most of them, that I am a former patient. I didn't tell the manager this when I filled out
the form. When I told him later, he said he was glad he hadn't known because he would
not have let me in.
Carter, Removing the Mental-Illness Stigma, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1977, at A31, col. 1. The article
reporting this statement, written by the honorary chairman of the Commission, Rosalynn Carter,
refers to testimony heard by the Commission "from several hundred professionals and lay persons
about the pain and the barriers facing mental patients in their own communities." Id. These "barriers" include people's reluctance to live near patients and former patients because they fear crime,
danger to their children, and reduced property values; zoning laws that exclude former mental patients; difficulties with job security and advancement; and the fact that many people consider need
for psychiatric care a disgrace. Id. "In sum, mental illness is still not acceptable in our society." Id.
Slovenko finds that the stigma attaches to the mere fact of receiving treatment: "By and large,
people in the community, even those who are well-informed on other matters, consider a person's
treatment by a psychiatrist as evidence of his 'queerness' or even insanity." Slovenko, supra note 27,
at 188. But see Shuman & Weiner, supra note 6, at 902 (some people in analysis seem to view
treatment as a status symbol).
The social stigma suffered by the psychotherapy patient who is or has been hospitalized is the
subject of a great deal of documentation. Medical professionals note that "much of the public attitude toward hospitalization is based on prejudice, [and] fear of social stigma . . . .[T]he patient
feels more an object of shame . . . the longer he remains hospitalized." Gralnick & Duncan,
Problems of the Patient in Transitfrom Hospital to Community, in MENTAL PATIENTS INTRANSITION 27 (M. Greenblatt, D. Levinson & G. Klerman eds. 1961). Because a patient "may see himself
as a shameful personL] . . . the patient may make every effort to deny his sickness not because he
does not want help, but because he does not want to be rejected." Id. at 28.
When alleged patient abuse and insurance fraud were investigated at Chicago Lakeshore Hospital, the patients feared "the effects of their hospitalization being made public." Zielenziger, Nothing
Sacred in Chicago, IncludingMedicalRecords, New Times, Oct. 28, 1977, at 12, col. 1. One patient
said, "It would jeopardize my job, no doubt about it. . . . The very fact of my having been in a
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choose to pay for psychotherapy out of their own pockets rather than
risk disclosure of psychiatric treatment by filing insurance claims with
employers. 5 The stigma that accompanies such disclosure can be particularly severe and damaging to politicians, high-level corporate executives, and other public figures.5 6 As a result, a "person may hesitate to
psychiatric hospital would tend to make people assume that there would be an element of instability." Id. Another patient said, "If my name ever came out without my consent . . . I would
never-never-go back into a hospital, even if I had another breakdown. I would die first." Id.
55. Sobel, Thousands with Mental Health Insurance Choose to Pay Own Bill, N.Y. Times, Aug.
4, 1981, at Cl, col. 1. This article cites Dr. Steven Sharfstein, associate director for behavioral
medicine at the National Institute for Mental Health, who estimates that about 15% of all adults
who have employer-provided mental health insurance waive reimbursement in order to conceal the
fact that they receive treatment. Dr. Sharfstein did not attempt to determine "the number of insured
employees who forego treatment rather than let their employers know" that they receive psychotherapy. Id. The article also refers to a poll of psychiatric patients that was conducted by Dr. Douglas
A. Sargent, a member of the American Psychiatric Association's Committee on Confidentiality, to
determine "whether the supposed stigma of psychotherapy has kept them from collecting insurance
benefits." Id. One patient responded: "I can remember cringing. . . when I realized that if I took
the job I had sought, I would have to turn in my medical bills to the personnel manager, to be
forwarded to the insurance company. Instead, I took another job without this requirement." Id. A
20 year-old college student paid cash despite financial difficulty, because of her ambitions for a political career. Id.
56. "In the case of very important persons, the mere fact of seeing a psychiatrist may permanently damage a career." Slovenko & Grossman, Confidentiality and Testimonial Privilege, in 3
PSYCHIATRY ch. 31, at 6 (J. Cavenar ed. 1985). For discussion of the effect of mental illness upon
celebrated public figures and the difficulties of administering treatment, see 8 GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, THE VIP wITH PSYCHIATRIC IMPAIRMENT, REPORT No.

83, at 153-

94 (1973) (discussing lack of effective procedures for dealing with the special situation of emotional
illness of public figures). The report notes that "[p]ersons in public life are often reluctant or unwilling to seek help from a psychiatrist. . . because they know that if this becomes known, they will be
jeopardizing their careers or shaking the confidence of their public in their decisions and their leadership." Id. at 183. "Through fear of loss of status and position, and for other reasons as well, many
VIPs conceal their identity while under treatment." Id. at 185. In addition, "[c]ompleting a successful treatment program does not necessarily bring an end to the problems of dealing with the VIP
patient . . . . The very fact that a person has undergone psychiatric care is still stigmatizing in
many quarters." Id. at 186. In sum, "[p]ublic knowledge of psychiatric inquiry is currently considered the kiss of death to a high-level official." Id. at 187.
An interesting account in the New York Times Magazine focused on the particular difficulties
and hazards for influential individuals seeking psychotherapy in Washington, D.C. See McElwaine,
On the Couch in the Capital,N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983 (Magazine), at 58. This article refers to the
experience of Senator Thomas F. Eagleton, who was dropped as George McGovern's vice-presidential running mate in 1972, upon confirming "that he had been hospitalized and received electric
shock treatment [in the 1960's] for nervous exhaustion and depression." Id. at 60. Disclosure of
Eagleton's psychiatric treatment rendered him a political liability for McGovern. Id.
In general, politicians fear admitting they receive psychotherapy because of the effect it might
have on voter confidence. Id Similarly, lawyers fear losing their clients, and journalists fear losing
their credibility with their readers. Id. Consequently, McElwaine concludes, many powerful individuals do their utmost to conceal the fact that they see psychotherapists. Id.
A fairly recent plan by the majority leader of the Minnesota Senate to hire a psychiatrist to be
available to members and legislative employees failed miserably in light of "shrink" jokes aimed at
the legislators and negative letters to local newspapers. See Plan Dropped to Hire Psychiatristfor
Minnesota Senate, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1980, at B2, col. 5. The counseling was intended to be
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visit a psychiatrist out of fear that he will be set apart from his fellow
57
man.",
Few commentators have argued in favor of protecting a patient's
identity under the psychotherapist-patient privilege, and no court has
adopted such position. 58 At least two federal courts, however, have
given favorable consideration to the underlying rationales for protecting
patient identity. In Lora v. Board of Education,59 a federal district court
in New York discussed both the theory of a constitutional right to privacy 60 and the psychotherapist-patient privilege in adjudicating a claim
available for problems that might affect a legislator's work, such as "alcoholism, insomnia and family difficulties." Id. After the plan failed, the majority leader was quoted as saying: "If we hire
anybody . . .it will be a preacher or a shepherd." Id Indeed, counselling by clergy has been
deemed to create less social stigma than medically provided psychotherapy. See Barden, Ministering
to EmotionsAs Well as to the Spirit, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1980, at 66, col. 1 (quoting Rev. Franklin
E. Vilas, Jr., of the President's Commission on Mental Health: "Many are more willing to go into
counseling connnected to the church because of a certain stigma attached to psychotherapy.").
In sum, for lay people and public figures alike, " mental illness. . . is the 'loathsome disease.'
Surveys indicate that the general public regards a person seeing a psychiatrist with fear, distrust or
dislike. The public generally feels or acts differently toward a psychiatric patient." Slovenko, Accountability, supra note 54, at 451. "It is sad, but nevertheless true, that there is still considerable
stigma in receiving mental health services." Id. (quoting letter from Sen. Daniel K. Inouye to Dr.
Mark Stem (date omitted), reprinted in 14 VoicEs/J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHOTHERAPISTS 76, 76
(1979)).
57. Slovenko, supra note 27, at 188.
58. See Comment, supra note 3, at 387 (erroneously applying the rules of the physician-patient
relationship and concluding that mere fact of consultation or dates or number of consultations is not
within the scope of the psychotherapist-patient privilege); supra note 6 and accompanying text.
59. 74 F.R.D. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
60. The constitutional right to privacy, as an alternative theory of confidentiality, will not be
extensively discussed in this note. Nevertheless, it is important to note that when constitutional
privacy rights are involved, they strengthen the case for the privilege claim. See id. at 570 ("Such a
[constitutional privacy] claim is particularly compelling when the material to be disclosed includes
communications by a patient to a psychotherapist."). In Lora, the plaintiffs alleged a violation of
"[t]wo distinct but related personal privacy interests." Id. The first was the right to have intimate
and embarrassing details protected from public exposure; the second was the right to make independent choices about things "that may seriously [a]ffect [one's] personal physical or mental
health-specifically, the right to be free to seek benefit from psychotherapeutic counseling." Id. For
a fuller treatment of the constitutional right to privacy as the basis for the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, see Smith, supra note 43, at 1-45.
Privacy rights are not the only possible constitutional foundation for protection of a psychotherapy patient's identity. Identity has been protected in the federal courts on the ground of freedom of
association. The Supreme Court has held in two landmark cases-NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958), and Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960)-that a court can deny requests for
disclosure of an individual's identity if such disclosure would deter the exercise of the individual's
freedom of association under the first and fourteenth amendments. Both of these decisions, however,
used the freedom of association as a basis for protecting identity in the context of political
association.
In NAACP v. Alabama, the Court recognized that the right to associate privately is an inherent
part of one's freedom of association. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 462. The Court addressed the question
"whether Alabama, consistently with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
[could] compel petitioner to reveal to the State's Attorney General the names and addresses of all its
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that a school district applied arbitrary and racially discriminatory standards "for identification, evaluation, and educational placement of emo'6
tionally handicapped children." '
Lora concerned a motion to produce documents; the records sought
were several randomly selected, anonymous diagnostic and evaluation
files. 62

In permitting discovery of the redacted files, the court based its

analysis on the assertion that, in the case of psychotherapy, "it is identity,
rather than anonymous communications, that patients generally wish to
'63
have shielded from exposure.
Consistent with the case-by-case approach of recognizing and analyzing privileges under Rule 501, the Lora court conducted a careful balancing of the public64 and private interests involved. 65 While it
Alabama members and agents, without regard to their positions or functions in the Association."
Id. at 451. The NAACP opposed disclosure of the identities of the group's ordinary "rank-and-file
members," because it feared unfavorable reprisals. Id. at 462-63. The group informed the Court of
the effect that such disclosure had had on individuals in the past: "[R]evelation of the identity of
• . .[such] rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility." Id. at 462. The
Court held that compelling this disclosure of the identity of individuals involved in advocacy (particularly of dissident or controversial views) might indeed infringe on their constitutional right to associate freely. Moreover, compelled disclosure might cause members to withdraw from the group and
might deter others from becoming affiliated, because they would anticipate negative consequences.
Id at 462-63. See also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960) (similar to Alabama; to require disclosure of the members' identities "would work a significant interference with
the freedom of association of [the NAACP's] members").
The Supreme Court has thus recognized the right to maintain anonymity with regard to association with political organizations aimed at advancing minority rights. Federal courts, however, have
failed to recognize a similar need to maintain anonymity as to individuals' associations with psychotherapists and psychotherapy undertaken for the purpose of improving individual mental health.
Just as members of the NAACP may fear harassment and harm from exposure of their affiliation,
psychiatric patients may fear embarrassment and stigmatization if their association with psychotherapists or mental treatment is publicly disclosed. See generally Smith, supra note 43, at 21-27 (discussing "autonomy privacy," i.e., the right to seek privately the benefits of psychotherapy, as distinct
from "information privacy," which concerns confidentiality of communications in therapy). The
right to pursue the benefits of psychiatric treatment should include the right to pursue them anonymously. In the scenarios typified by Alabama and Bates, the federal courts weigh the state's need to
compel disclosure of an association's membership against the individual's freedom to associate anonymously. It follows that these courts should also weigh the competing interests that are implicated
when the identity of a psychiatric patient is in issue. As mandated by Federal Rule of Evidence 501,
the federal courts must undertake this analysis on a case-by-case basis; by using the in camerahearings that are used in analogous situations, they can investigate these competing interests in a nonpublic setting. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
61. Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 568.
62. Id. at 567.
63. Id. at 586-87 (emphasis added).
64. "Of all the factors in the balancing equation, the most constant is the need for full development of the facts in federal litigation in order that the paramount public interest in the fair administration ofjustice be served." Id at 578; see also FED. R. EvID. 102 ("These rules shall be construed
to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of
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permitted discovery of the files, the court conditioned their availability
on complete redaction and codification as to patient identity. 66 The
premise of the Lora decision is that, to both the psychotherapist 67 and
the patient, 68 protection of identity is the crucial element of the psycho-

therapist-patient relationship.
In In re Pebsworth,69 the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit recognized the importance of protecting patient identity
in the course of the psychotherapist-patient relationship. Pebsworth, like
Zuniga, involved a psychotherapist's challenge to a grand jury subpoena
in connection with an investigation of alleged billing fraud.70 The subpoena required records that included patient names, dates of treatment,
and some patients' diagnoses. 7 ! Reasoning that the patient had waived
the psychotherapist-patient privilege by filing insurance reimbursement
claims, 72 the court of appeals ordered production of the records for the
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined.").
65. Four factors were considered in determining whether disclosure of identity would interfere
with the plaintiff's privilege expectations:
First, is the identification of the individuals required for effective use of the data? Second,
is the invasion of privacy and risk of psychological harm being limited to the narrowest
possible extent? Third, will the data be supplied only to qualified personnel under strict
controls over confidentiality? Fourth, is the data necessary or simply desirable?
Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 579.
66. Id. at 586-87.
67. Both the Lora court and various commentators have emphasized the day-to-day efforts of
psychotherapists to maintain the confidentiality of patient identity. See id. at 581-82. According to
Slovenko, psychotherapists' efforts to preserve confidentiality are not motivated simply by fear of
defamation or invasion of privacy actions by a patient. Rather, the profession must assure patients
complete confidentiality in order to preserve public trust. Slovenko, supra note 27, at 188.
Psychotherapists maintain their own financial and business records in a manner that conceals
the identity of the particular patient in therapy. Psychotherapists discuss their fees with patients at
the beginning of the relationship to avoid using bill-collecting agencies, id. at 188-89, and "[q]uite
frequently, patients are recorded by number in the [psychotherapists'] ledger so that their names will
not be known to accountants or internal revenue agents." Id. at 189. Furthermore, when publishing
scientific data, "[psychotherapists] disguise their clinical data to avoid the recognition of the patient,
often to the detriment of the scientific value of the material." Id. In contrast, in scientific writing
and teaching, physicians publish medical studies in full, merely withholding the patients' names. See
Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 581 ("Although medical practitioners maintain that their discipline mandates
strict confidentiality, they have regularly published patients' case histories in both scientific journals
and the popular press."); Freed, A Legal Structure for a NationalMedical Data Center, 49 B.U.L.
REV. 80, 81 (1969) (discussing obligation of national medical data center to withhold patient identities and other information).
68. See Lora, 74 F.R.D. at 580 ("[M]ost persons protest not the mere disclosure of private,
embarrassing or damaging information, but rather the concomitant disclosure of identifying data.").
69. 705 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1983).
70. Id. at 261-62; Zuniga, 714 F.2d at 634.
71. Pebsworth, 705 F.2d at 262.
72. Id.
No evidentiary privilege is absolute. For a general discussion of the qualifications to which the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is subject, see S. HERR, S. ARONS & R. WALLACE, LEGAL RIGHTS
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limited purposes of the investigation. 73 Nevertheless, the court qualified
its action with the following instruction: "We trust, however, that the
grand jury, related investigative bodies, and, if an indictment is returned,
the trial court, will take scrupulous measures to ensure that there occurs
no unnecessary disclosure of patients' names or diagnoses." 74
Although neither Lora nor Pebsworth extended the psychotherapistpatient privilege to bar the production of documents necessary to a criminal investigation, each acknowledged the importance of protecting patient identity in the course of psychiatric treatment. The federal courts,
however, have failed to include identity within the protective scope of the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. In contrast, the federal courts have
chosen to protect individual identity in analogous situations. 75 The policies behind these protected relationships are comparable to those warranting protection of identity in the psychotherapist-patient relationship.
IV.

ANALOGOUS RELATIONSHIPS IN WHICH
ANONYMITY IS PRESERVED

In at least three situations, the federal courts have protected individual identity in order to preserve a confidential relationship. These cases
have involved the journalist-source relationship, 76 the government informant, 77 and, in specific circumstances, the attorney-client relationship. 78 Each of these relationships benefits society as a whole, 79 and is
endangered to some degree when identities are released. In the above
situations, courts have afforded anonymity when disclosure of identity
would place individuals in danger 8o or would subject them to undue harassment or prejudice. 8'
Similar considerations apply in the case of the psychotherapist-patient relationship. Patients undergoing treatment will more readily reveal their inner thoughts and emotions if assured of confidentiality. 8 2 In
98 (1983). Yet it is questionable whether filing an insurance reimbursement claim should be deemed a waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. For the argument that "the traditional waiver doctrines are inappropriate in the context of present day medical
insurance," see Pebsworth, 705 F.2d at 264 (Gray, J., concurring). See also Note, Privilege, supra
note 8,at 397 nn. 101-03.
73. Pebsworth, 705 F.2d at 264.
74. Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
75. See infra notes 85-143.
76. See infra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 100-21 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 122-43 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 88, 99, 101, 122 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 94, 103, 104, 118 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 103, 104, 118, 121, 128-34 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 36, 38-40 and accompanying text.
AND MENTAL HEALTH CARE
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addition, because of the social stigma attaching to the patient in psychotherapy, patients must be guaranteed anonymity if they are to be encouraged to seek treatment.8 3 Thus, as the following analogies illustrate,
judicial protection of a patient's identity is necessary to ensure successful
treatment, which benefits not only the individual patient, but society as a
84
whole.
A.

The Journalist'sSource.

As in the psychotherapist-patient relationship, trust is the foundation for the alliance between a journalist and a confidential source.8 5 If
confidentiality of the source's identity is not guaranteed, then the poten-

tial harm to the source 86 discourages formation and continuation of the
journalist-source relationship.8 7 In addition, exposure will deter sources
from approaching the press with information, thus chilling the free flow
of news to the public. 88
The journalist-source privilege was not recognized at common law

because it was thought that the privilege did not satisfy Wigmore's four
criteria;89 the very purpose of the relationship is to permit public disclosure of the source's information. At least two commentators, however,
have detected a flaw in that analysis. Journalists do not seek a privilege
against disclosure of confidential communications, but of the source's
identity.90 The commentators reason that Wigmore's criteria would be
satisfied if applied to the informant's identity alone. 9 1
83. See supra notes 21, 42, 51, 53-57 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
85. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 669 n.5 (1972).
86. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972) ("The deterrent effect such
disclosure [of confidential sources] is.likely to have upon. . . reporting. . . threatens freedom of
the press and the public's need to be informed."), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973); Carter, The
Journalist,His Informant and Testimonial Privilege, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 1111, 1124 (1960) ("It is in
the public interest for informants to inform newspapermen. Some informants may be inhibited from
doing so, unless they can be confident that their own identities will be kept secret.").
89. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; Guest & Stanzler, The ConstitutionalArgument
for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 18, 26 (1969). The authors explain:
"Courts are not always explicit in citing Wigmore, but the grounds which they give invariably indicate a failure to meet at least one of the four conditions." Id. at 26 n.46.
90. See Guest & Stanzler, supra note 89, at 27. Guest and Stanzler contend:
[A] literal application of Wigmore's conditions to the issue of the newsman's privilege
borders on sophistry and drastically miscontrues the problem. The newsman is not claiming a privilege to conceal the basic information communicated to him by the informant. He
is claiming to conceal only the identity of the source and nothing more.
Id. (emphasis added).
91. First, the source divulges his name to the journalist with the expectation of confidentiality;
second, anonymity is essential to the relationship because the source will not provide information
without it; third, fostering the relationship is essential in order to facilitate the free flow of informa-
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Because the privilege was rejected at common law, its proponents
have resorted to constitutional claims grounded in the first amendment
in order to protect source identity. 92 Thus the debate has focused on the

claim that failure to protect source identity threatens the free dissemination of news to the public. In addressing this claim, federal courts have

evaluated the potential injury to the individual source and to the journalist-source relationship, and many have concluded that a qualified jour93
nalist-source privilege protects the identity of a confidential source.
tion to the community; and finally, under many circumstances, the injury to the relationship by
disclosure of identity outweighs the social benefits gained by the quick resolution of litigation. Id.
92. Id. passim. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Supreme Court first addressed
the journalist-source relationship from a constitutional perspective. Branzburg involved a newsman
who published an article describing the activity of confidential sources involved in synthesizing hashish from marijuana. .1d. at 667. Branzburg was subpoenaed by a Kentucky grand jury, and although
he appeared, he refused to identify the individuals involved in the criminal activity, claiming that the
first amendment conferred on him a journalist-source privilege. Id. at 670-71.
The issue in Branzburg, as defined by the Court, was "whether requiring newsmen to appear
and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed
by the First Amendment." Id. at 667. Petitioners' argument focused on the claim that to facilitate
complete and accurate news-gathering, agreements to keep a source's identity confidential were necessary; if disclosure to the grand jury of a source's identity is compelled, sources "will be measurably
deterred from furnishing publishable information, all to the detriment of the free flow of information
protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 680. The Court, however, declined to grant the newsmen a privilege against testifying before the grand jury because the criminal activity of the source
was at issue. Id at 690. Throughout the opinion, however, the Court acknowledged that, where the
source was not involved in criminal activity, the government's interest in disclosure would be weakened. The majority conceded that innocent sources "may fear that disclosure will threaten their job
security or personal safety or that it will simply result in dishonor or embarrassment." Id. at 693.
The federal courts quickly reacted to Branzburg, confining the decision to its facts. For example, in Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that federal law and public policy do not
require across-the-board disclosure of confidential sources whenever the disclosure issue is raised.
Id. at 781. Baker declared Branzburg inapposite in a civil setting, where courts will often find "the
public interest in non-disclosure of journalists' confidential news sources . . . weightier than the
private interest in compelled disclosure." Id. at 785.
Baker, id. at 784, directs attention to Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Branzburg, 408
U.S. at 709-10. Powell's concurrence emphasized the "limited nature of the Court's holding," indicating that analysis of all cases, including criminal cases, would be undertaken on a case-by-case
basis. Id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring). Stewart's dissent sets forth the policy considerations
relevant to such an analysis. These considerations include the belief that it is "obvious that the
promise of confidentiality may be a necessary prerequisite to a productive relationship between a
newsman and his informants." Id. at 729 (Stewart, J., dissenting). This dissent also notes that some
sources require confidentiality "because of a reasonable fear of reprisals or censure for unorthodox
views." Id. at 729-30. Finally, consideration is given to the source's lack of personal involvement in
the criminal conduct at issue. Id.
93. See, eg., Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v.
Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 596 (Ist Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621
F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981); Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d
708, 715 (3d Cir. 1979); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373, 374-75 (4th Cir. 1976), affid, 561 F.2d 539 (1977); Baker v. F
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Both courts and commentators have noted that injury may befall the
confidential source as well as the journalist-source relationship if identity
is disclosed. The individual source desires anonymity, particularly when
94
furnishing sensitive information that could lead to retribution.
Although the policy behind the journalist-source relationship is geared

toward the free flow of information to the public, and thus has constitutional implications, the value that anonymity holds for the individual
95
source is also an important consideration.

The federal courts, especially in civil cases, 96 are sympathetic to the
& F Inv. 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972), cert denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Gulliver's Periodicals v.
Charles Levy Circulating Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
The first case to discuss the protection of identity for a journalist's source was Garland v. Torre,
259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). The Garlandcourt refused to protect the
identity of the source involved because the identity "went to the heart of the plaintiff's claim." Id. at
550. Similarly, later cases have refused to protect a source's identity where it was central to the
plaintiff's cause of action. See, eg., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 637 (D.D.C. 1974) (identity not
protected because "critical to appellee's claim"). Conversely, in Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778,
783-84 (2d Cir. 1972), cert denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973), the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit indicated that there is no reason to disclose identity when it is only tangentially
related to the case.
94. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1971) (confidential sources "may fear that
disclosure will threaten their job security or that it will simply result in dishonor or embarrassment"); Cerrito v. Time, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1071, 1074-76 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (source's identity protected when court record showed that source was subject to "known and immediate danger"); see
also Note, Source Protection in Libel Suits After Herbert v. Lando, 81 COLUM. L. Rav. 338, 341-42
(1981):
[W]hen the information imparted is sensitive, or the individual is in a vulnerable position, a
source may be willing to supply information on a confidential basis only. When courts
order journalists to disclose the identities of confidential sources in libel suits, the consequences are likely to inhibit both journalists and sources in providing information to the
public.
Id.
95. One commentator conducted an empirical study of journalists to determine, among other
things, whether the journalists believed it was more important to protect the identity of sources, or
the contents of their communications. Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70
MICH. L. RaV. 229, 277 (1971). The overwhelming majority (9 1%) of those that responded to the
question stated that identity required more complete protection. Id at 278. The commentator noted
that:
Most of the persons whom I personally interviewed confirmed this preference. Several of
these newsmen, however, considered the question a Hobson's choice. They stressed the
point that both categories are important and that, if a newsman's privilege is to be qualified,
the exceptions should be constructed along lines other than this dichotomy between
identity and contents.
Id. For additional discussion of the value of source anonymity in the journalist-source relationship,
see, e.g., Case Comment, Freedom of the Press-ReporterHas FirstAmendment Right to Refuse to
Appear and Testify Before Grand Jury About Confidential Sources and Information-Caldwell v.
United States, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1536, 1538 (1971).
96. Courts discussing the journalist-source privilege often state, in deference to the Supreme
Court's holding in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), that protection of a source's identity is
more justifiable in civil litigation than in a criminal proceeding. In Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d
778, 784 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied. 411 U.S. 966 (1973), however, the Second Circuit noted that, in
his Branzburg concurrence, Justice Powell "emphasized the limited nature of the Court's holding,
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protection of source identity in the journalist-source relationship. For
example, in Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 97 a federal district court in

Virginia observed that for effective reporting, a newsman may have to
agree to keep his source confidential. If he is forced to disclose his
source, "the sources so disclosed, other confidential sources of other reporters, and potential confidential sources will be significantly deterred

from furnishing further information to the press."' 98 In addition, the
quality and utility of the information given may decline. 99
The concerns expressed by the court in Gilbert reflect the same poli-

cies involved in the psychotherapist-patient relationship. Like a journalist's source, a patient in need of psychotherapy will hesitate to disclose
information without a guarantee of confidentiality with regard to iden-

tity. Moreover, once the relationship is established, the success of therapy depends on the patient's ability to speak freely about thoughts and
feelings, including those deemed socially unacceptable. The possibility of
identity disclosure and of the concurrent exposure of emotional or psy-

chological infirmities requiring treatment substantially weakens the psychotherapist-patient relationship.
Furthermore, as it does in the case of the confidential source, public
policy demands anonymity for psychotherapy patients. A source's identity is protected to facilitate the gathering of important news. Moreover,

if a reporter must divulge a source's identity, other informers are put on
and expressly stated that in his view Branzburg did not compel a journalist 'to give information
bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the [grand jury] investigation.'" Id
(quoting Branzburg 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring)). In his concurrence, Powell declared:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper
balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant
testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and
societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.
In short, the courts will be available under circumstances where legitimate First
Amendment interests require protection.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (emphasis added). Many courts view Powell's concurrence as the "key"
to the decision. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilegefor Newsmen,

26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 716-17 (1975). See, eg., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 510 (E.D.
Va. 1976); Apicello v. McNeil Laboratories, 66 F.R.D. 78, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Loadholtz v. Fields,
389 F. Supp. 1299, 1301-02 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp.
1394, 1397-98 (D.D.C. 1973).
97. 411 F. Supp. 505, 508 (E.D. Va. 1976).
98. Id. See also Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, 66 F.R.D. 78, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)
("[P]rotection of the identity of sources is often essential to the willingness of these sources to give
information to the press .... ").
99. One commentator notes that: "[G]ood reporting frequently depends on sources who will
relax and speak in a spontaneous, expansive, and candid fashion. . . . [Doubt as to the confidentiality of identity] can introduce into the relationship a self-consciousness and guardedness that may
preclude the possibility of in-depth, interpretive coverage." Blasi, supra note 95, at 266.
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notice of the occurrence, and the unwillingness to provide information
becomes widespread, to the detriment of the public. These observations
are also pertinent to the case of the psychotherapy patient. If patient
identity is revealed, others seriously in need of therapy are, as a group,
deterred from seeking treatment. It is therefore in the public interest to
allow the fact of treatment to remain confidential so that potential patients receive the treatment they need.
B.

Government Informants.

The federal courts have historically recognized the value of government informants, and protected their identities. ic The Supreme Court
has stated that the courts must recognize the testimonial privilege in order to encourage citizens to inform the government about the commission of crimes. 10 1 Regardless of the informant's motivation-"good
citizenship, promise of leniency, or prospect of pecuniary reward" 102such communications are voluntary. The informant "condition[s] his cooperation on an assurance of anonymity-to protect himself and his family from harm, to preclude adverse social reactions and to avoid the risk
' °3
of defamation or malicious prosecution actions against him."
Policies supporting confidentiality of an informant's identity can be
classified into two separate but related categories. In the first category,
confidentiality serves to protect the sources, who may perceive a threat to
their own physical safety, or fear acquiring a reputation in the community as a "squealer" or "stool pigeon." 1°4 In the second category, confidentiality of a source's identity enhances the government's ability to
enforce the law; the disclosure of an informant's identity would discour100. See Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 55, 67 (1956); Scher v. United States, 305 U.S.
251, 254 (1938) ("[Public policy forbids disclosure of an informer's identity unless essential to the
defense.
...
); In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535-36 (1895) ("It is the right [and] the duty of every
citizen. . . to communicate to the executive officers any information which he has of the commission of an offence against [the] laws; and such information is a privileged and confidential communication.
...
); Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311, 316 (1884) (similar).
101. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 308 (1967) (quoting 8 J.WIGMORE, supranote 30, § 2374,
at 761-62). It is generally believed that the privilege belongs to the government, so that it may
safeguard its lines of communication with those who are privy to information about violations of the
law. See, eg., Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). McCormick posits, however, that
the informant himself may invoke the privilege. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 111, at 270 (3d
ed. 1984) and the cases cited therein.
102. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 308 (1967) (quoting 8 J.WIGMORE, supranote 30, § 2374,
at 761-62).
103. Id.
104. See eg., Gutterman, The Informer Privilege, 58 J. CRIM.L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
32, 34 (1967) ("A most compelling deterrent against informing is the sinister connotation of the
word itself. The informant resents being referred to as a squealer, stoolie, rat, stool pigeon,
squawker, or in similar terms.").
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age other potential informants from reporting crimes.10 5

The common law developed an almost absolute right 10 6 to protect
the identity of an informer who simply relayed incriminating informa-

tion. 10 7 This view was modified, however, by Roviaro v. United States, 08
the seminal case regarding this privilege in the federal courts. Roviaro
involved an appeal from a conviction for possession and illegal transpor-

tation of heroin. The trial court sustained the government's refusal to
disclose the identity of an undercover informant.1 0 9 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed,1 10 but the Supreme
Court reversed. The Court held that the government must disclose an
informant's identity if it is "relevant and helpful to the defense of an

accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause."' I The Court
said that "no fixed rule" should govern disclosure of identity;' 1 2 rather, a

court should balance, on a case-by-case basis, the public's interest in law
105. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 2374, at 761-62. The Supreme Court clearly advocated
these policies, and included within article V of the Proposed Rules of Evidence a specific testimonial
privilege, Rule 510, protecting the identity of the informant. Proposed Rule 510 provided in pertinent part:
(a) Rules ofprivilege. The government or a state or subdivision thereof has a privilege to
refuse to disclose the identity of a person who has furnished information relating to or
assisting in an investigation of a possible violation of law to a law enforcement officer or
member of a legislative committee or its staff conducting an investigation.
(b) Who may claim. The privilege may be claimed by an appropriate representative of
the government, regardless of whether the information was furnished to an officer of the
government or of a state or subdivision thereof. The privilege may be claimed by an appropriate representative of a state or subdivision if the information was furnished to an officer
thereof, except that in criminal cases the privilege shall not be allowed if the government
objects.
Proposed Rule 510, 56 F.R.D. 183, 255 (1973).
106. Every common law privilege is subject to certain limitations. Limitations on the informant
privilege include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) It applies only to the informant's identity,
not to communications; (2) the party can voluntarily or constructively waive the privilege if his
identity is already known to the adversary; and (3) the privilege only applies when the informant
communicates to a party having the "responsibility or duty to investigate or to prevent public
wrongs." 8 J. WIGMORE supra note 30, § 2374(0, at 765-67 (emphasis in original).
107. See, eg., Portomene v. United States, 221 F.2d 582, 583-84 (5th Cir. 1955) (identity of
informant who merely gives information can be protected); United States v. Conforti, 200 F.2d 365,
367 (7th Cir. 1952) ("[Clommunications made by informers to the Government are privileged.");
Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627, 628-29 (9th Cir. 1947) (distinguishing between informers
who merely give information and whose identity can be protected, and informers who take part in
the crime for which defendant is charged and whose identity is not privileged).
108. 353 U.S. 53 (1957). Roviaro involved the identity of an undercover informer who was instrumental in setting up the arrest of the accused. Specifically, the informer aided the police by
executing a drug pick-up, in concert with petitioner, that was witnessed by narcotics agents. See id.
at 56-57.
109. See United States v. Roviaro, 229 F.2d 812, 813 (7th Cir. 1956) (trial court decision
unreported).
110. Id. at 816.
111. Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60-61.
112. Id at 62.
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enforcement against the defendant's right to prepare his case.' 13
In general, disclosure of identity has been required by the federal
courts if the informant and the defendant were the only participants in
the transaction, 114 if the informant played an active role in the crime
charged," 5 "if the [informant] is a material witness on the issue of guilt"
or innocence, 116 or if the informant's credibility is in question. 117 Absent
such circumstances, the informant's identity is privileged where neces-

sary to protect him from danger or embarrassment," 18 to encourage him
to continue to provide information helpful to law enforcement officials,
and to encourage the activity of other informers." 19

Pgychotherapy patients are similar in relevant respects to government informants. An informant's communications are voluntary and
serve the public by aiding law enforcement officials. Exposure of one
120
informant's identity would discourage others from stepping forward.
Similarly, patients generally seek psychiatric treatment on a voluntary
basis. The result generally benefits not only the patient, but the community as well. In addition, the assurance of anonymity encourages people
113. Id. The court's balancing process should take "into consideration the crime charged, the
possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony, and all other relevant fac-

tors." Id.
An in camera hearing may be employed so that the judge may hear testimony relevant to the
balancing process. See United States v. Fischer, 531 F.2d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 1976) (remanding case
and requiring in camera hearing to determine "the interests which the government may have in
resisting . . . production [of the informer]," and the relative importance of the informer's testimony); United States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464,465, 467 (3d Cir. 1967) (in camera session with informer
held; concurring opinion notes that judge inquired whether informant was in danger of physical
harm and whether his testimony would assist defendant).
114. See Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 64 ('This is a case where the Government's informer was the sole
participant, other than the accused, in the transaction charged. The informer was the only witness
in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of government witnesses.").
115. See id. at 64; United States v. Whitley, 734 F.2d 1129, 1138 (6th Cir. 1984) (identity protected where informant did not participate in drug transaction); United States v. Ayala, 643 F.2d
244, 246 (5th Cir. 1981) CThe more active the [informants'] participation, the greater the need for
identification."); United States v. Clark, 482 F.2d 103, 104 (5th Cir. 1973) (identity protected where
informant did not participate in illegal transaction).
116. 8 J.WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 2374(f)(4), at 768; see McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 305
(1966); Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 64; Gaines v. Hess, 662 F.2d 1364, 1368 (10th Cir. 1981) (if identity of
informant is critical to defense, constitutional due process requires disclosure).
117. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 2374(f)(4), at 768-69. See generally Smith v. Illinois, 390
U.S. 129, 131, 133 n.8 (1967) (holding Roviaro inapplicable if informant testifies at trial as witness
for the prosecution; in such a case, prosecution must reveal the identity if informant's credibility is in
issue); United States v. Tucker, 380 F.2d 206, 211 (2d Cir. 1967) (disclosure of identity required
"only where independent evidence was so insubstantial" that reliability of informant is sole basis of
all evidence).
118. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
119. See Note, The Privilege of Withholding the Identity of an Informer, 28 U. PrTT. L. REV.
477, 477 (1967) (summarizing objectives served by protecting informants' identities).
120. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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to consult psychotherapists without fear of social stigma; exposure of one

patient's identity could deter others from seeking needed treatment.
Applying the Roviaro analysis, psychiatric patients are seldom active participants in the transaction under investigation, and, if called to

the stand, would rarely contribute material testimony. In contrast to the
situation of a government informant, neither the patient's reliability nor
his credibility is in issue. Furthermore, just as an informant fears the
brand of "squealer" or "stoolie" if his identity is revealed,121 the patient
undergoing psychotherapy fears the badge of "crackpot" or "lunatic," if

his identity goes unprotected. Yet an informant's identity is privileged
while the psychotherapy patient's identity is not. These analogies
demonstrate that the psychiatric patient's identity merits protection comparable to that given the identity of the government informant. A psy-

chiatric patient is entitled to remain anonymous in judicial proceedings
to which the patient has only a tenuous relationship.
C. Attorney-Client Privilege.

Another situation in which the federal courts have protected individual identity is the attorney-client relationship. 122 While a court's goal

in litigation is to uncover the truth, the client's goal is to obtain "adequate [legal] advice and a proper defense." 12 3 It is accepted that full

disclosure is necessary for the lawyer to function effectively,1 24 and that a
client will voluntarily disclose more information if assured of confidenti-

ality through the attorney-client privilege.12 5 This essential concept of
trust in the attorney-client relationship is similarly necessary for full
disclosure and effective treatment in the psychotherapist-patient

relationship.
As is the case with all testimonial privileges, the scope of the attorney-client privilege is determined on a case-by-case basis. Although cli121. See Gutterman, supra note 104, at 34.
122. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the attorney-client privilege is the oldest testimonial privilege recognized at common law. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1980).
The Upjohn Court stated that the privilege's "purpose is to encourage full and frank communication
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance
of law and the administration of justice." Id.
123. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 1960).
124. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1979) ("The lawyer-client privilege rests on
the need for the advocate. . . to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to be carried out."); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,
403 (1975) ("The purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their
attorney.").
125. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (attorney's knowledge and skill "can only be
safely and readily availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure").
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ent identity does not normally fall within the scope of the privilege, 126 the
12 7
federal courts have established at least two exceptions to this rule.

The first exception, labeled the "legal advice" exception, holds identity
protectable if disclosure "would implicate the client in the very matter
for which legal advice was sought." 128 The second, related exception
protects identity if "so much of the actual communication has already
been disclosed that identification of the client amounts to disclosure of a
129
confidential communication."

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit discussed
the "legal advice" exception in United States v. Hodge & Zweig.130 In
Hodge, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summoned certain attorneys

to produce a client's financial records. 31 At the same time, a grand jury
was investigating alleged drug violations by that client and others.1 32 Because the tax investigation continued during the criminal prosecution,
the lawyers refused to comply with the IRS summons, claiming the attorney-client privilege.13 3 Although the court noted that fee information

sought for a legitimate purpose is generally not privileged, it recognized
that the rule "is qualified by an important exception. . . where the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that
disclosure of [client identity and fee arrangements] would implicate that

client in the very criminal activity for which legal advice was sought."' 134
126. See, e.g., Gannett v. First Nat'l State Bank, 546 F.2d 1072, 1073 n.4 (3d Cir. 1976) (absent
"unusual circumstances," client identity is not within scope of attorney-client privilege), cert. denied,

431 U.S. 954 (1977).
127. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gordon), 722 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 1983).
128. See, eg., id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Marger/Merenbach), 695
F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982)).
129. NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1965). Other cases that either acknowledge
or support this exception include: In re Witnesses Before the Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729
F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 1984) (disclosure of fees paid by known client is "less likely to reveal confidential communications than would the revelation of an unknown client's identity"); In re Slaughter,
694 F.2d 1258, 1260 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (exception applies only to fee information that would expose
identity of "previously undisclosed client/suspect"); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d
Cir. 1962) (protection may result "where the substance of a disclosure has already been revealed but
not its source"), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 632 (9th Cir.
1960) (client identity is protected if disclosure would convey information that is part of the usual
privileged communication); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir.) ("[T]here may be
situations in which so much has already appeared of the actual communications between an attorney
and a client, that the disclosure of the client will result in a breach of the privilege .
), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 752 (1944).
130. 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
131. Id. at 1349.
132. Id. at 1350.
133. Id. at 1349-50.
134. Id at 1353. The exception derives from the rule set out in Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623
(9th Cir. 1960), that a client's identity must be protected where disclosure would reveal a confidential communication of the "ultimate motive of litigation." Id. at 630 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, § 2313
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United States v. Liebman 135 is a recent, salient example of the second type of circumstance-the actual communications exception-that
supports protection of identity in the attorney-client relationship. The
appellants in Liebman were attorneys who evaluated real estate partnerships for clients seeking tax-shelter investments; they charged fees only to
those clients that invested.1 36 The IRS, discovering that some of these
clients had deducted the fees as legal expenses on their tax returns,
claimed that these payments were not legal fees, but were, in fact, nondeductible brokerage fees. 137 The agency hoped to identify the other clients
that had deducted the fees. Liebman and his firm refused to reveal the
names, addresses or social security numbers of the clients, claiming the
attorney-client privilege. 138 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit agreed that the disclosure of the clients' identities would
indeed reveal the content of the privileged communications-that the clients were advised that the fees were tax deductible-and that the identi139
ties were therefore protected by the attorney-client privilege.
The rationales underlying each of these two exceptions could be applied to protect identity in the psychotherapist-patient situation. First,
disclosure of identity implicates the patient in the very matter for which
treatment was initially sought. Disclosure of a patient's identity in the
context of an investigation would reveal that the patient sought treatment for some mental or emotional infirmity. The feared social stigma
would attach automatically, labeling the patient as "mentally ill." Second, because of its sensitive nature, the fact that a person is receiving
psychotherapy can be likened to a substantive communication between
the psychotherapist and the patient. Thus, disclosure of identity can reveal mental or emotional infirmity just as disclosure of the identities in
Liebman would have revealed income tax evasion.
Whether a client's identity is protected by the attorney-client privilege depends upon the facts of each case. 140 The leading case articulating
this case-by-case analysis in the attorney-client context is Baird v. Koer(3d ed. 1940)). In Hodge, the Bairdrule was applied and, preliminarily, appeared to protect identifying information which could have implicated unnamed clients in the drug conspiracy. Hodge, 548
F.2d at 1354. Nevertheless, the court ordered disclosure of the identifying information on other
grounds. Id. at 1355. The court noted that the government had established a prima facie case "that
the attorneys were retained in furtherance of a continuing conspiracy." Id. Applying the "crime or

fraud exception" to the attorney-client privilege, the court determined that the information was not
protected. Id. at 1354-55.
135. 742 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1984).

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 808.
Id
Id.
Id, at 810-11.
See Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1960).
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ner. 14 1 In Baird, an attorney was asked to reveal the identities and addresses of several clients who employed him to transmit delinquent
income tax payments. The attorney raised the attorney-client privilege,
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed that
under the facts of the case, client identity was entitled to protection. 142
Particularly relevant for the court was the fact that no litigation between
the delinquent taxpayers and the IRS existed. The taxpayers had neither
filed suit against the government nor sought any judicial determination
concerning "the correctness of the amount. . .[or even] the fact that
any sum [was] owed by them." 14 3

Often, as the facts of Zuniga show, the psychotherapy patient finds
himself subject to a dispute which is not of his making. The argument in
favor of protection of identity is, in fact, more compelling in the Zuniga

context than on the facts of Baird; the psychotherapy patient is even less
likely than the delinquent taxpayer to be a party to the litigation. While

the courts have protected identity in the attorney-client situation in contexts where disclosure would substantially prejudice the client, they have
failed to protect identity under the psychotherapist-patient privilege even
though the patient might suffer substantial prejudice. Though disclosure
of patients' identities might expedite certain investigations, the damage
that would inure to the psychotherapist-patient relationship by the disclosure far outweighs that consideration. The patient undergoing psy-

chotherapy must be accorded anonymity so as not to thwart the primary
goal of the psychotherapist-patient privilege-uninhibited communica-

tion between patient and therapist.
V.

CONCLUSION

The psychotherapist-patient privilege faces two substantial barriers
in the federal courts. First, many courts have failed to recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege at all, because they equate it with the physician-patient privilege-a privilege not recognized at common law.
Second, the courts that have recognized the privilege have declined to
extend its scope to include protection of a patient's identity.
The standard for recognizing testimonial privileges under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 justifies the application of a psychotherapist-patient privilege. The psychotherapy patient is expected to reveal his innermost thoughts and feelings-which may be irrational or offensive to
141. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).

142. Id. at 630.
143. Id. at 630-31. The taxpayers had "merely stated, through an attorney, 'I am worried about
my position if the government ever investigates my tax return. Hence I deem it wise to pay X dollars
to the government now.'" IM. at 631.
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others-during the course of psychiatric treatment. The psychotherapist-patient relationship is unlike the general physician-patient relationship in that if a psychotherapy patient is not assured of confidentiality
with regard to any information that he reveals, the patient is not likely to
cooperate with the psychotherapist, or even to seek treatment.
Moreover, the majority of federal courts addressing the issue have
failed to recognize the need for confidentiality as to thefact of treatment,
even though the average person fears the social stigma that accompanies
identification as a psychotherapy patient. This apprehension may hinder
successful therapy and deter people from seeking needed treatment. In
several similar situations, however, the federal courts have protected individual identity. The policies behind protection of identity in the analogous situations impel the protection of identity in the psychotherapistpatient relationship.
An absolute privilege of anonymity need not extend to a psychotherapy patient under all circumstances. It is settled law that just as the
existence of privileges under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 must be determined on a case-by-case basis, the scope of such privileges must be determined on a case-by-case basis as well. Once a federal court concludes
that a psychotherapist-patient privilege should be recognized, the court,
in appropriate cases, should also extend Rule 501 protection to a patient's identity, as well as to confidential communications taking place
between patient and psychotherapist. In many cases, psychotherapy patients are not parties to the judicial proceedings, have not participated in
the activity under investigation, and are otherwise only tangentially related to the issues in the case. It is suggested that, where such circumstances exist, courts are presented with an appropriate opportunity for
the extension of the psychotherapist-patient privilege to protect a patient's identity.

Ellen S. Soffin

